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Summary findings
During the past two decades there has been an important  through the acquisition of existing domestic firms or the
increase in investment abroad and a worldwide rush  entry of foreign firms) or its trade orientation  (whether
toward free trade.  Olarreaga argues that the increase in  foreign capital enters the export or import-competing
investment abroad may partially explain the worldwide  sectors).
rush toward free trade.  There will either be increased counterlobbying for
In a model of endogenous determination  of trade  protection by the export sector or reduced lobbying for
protection through lobbying - where  the government is  protection in the import-competing  sector, because of
also concerned about income redistribution among  the scale effect associated with an increase in the
owners of foreign and national factors of production  - equilibrium wage.
foreign capital's entry into a host country will probably  If foreign entry occurs in the import-competing  sector,
reduce the endogenous level of protection.  protection might increase because of the scale effect, but
If the elasticity of substitution between labor and  under reasonable assumptions about the value of the
capital is small enough, Olarreaga shows, protection  elasticity of substitution between labor and capital,
cannot increase after the entry of foreign capital,  protection will also fall.
regardless of the form of investment abroad (whether
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earlier version.Non-Technical Summary
Investment abroad has exploded in the last two decades. In  1997, the sum of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment was 11 times larger than in the
early  1980s. Participation  of  developing  countries  as  hosts  of  world  FDI  was  also
multiplied  by two since  1985. Such an increasingly important phenomenon cannot  be
ignored when analyzing the determinants of international trade policy.
Trade policy also experienced a significant amount of change during the last two decades.
As world FDI flows increased tenfold, an important wave of trade liberalization struck
worldwide. Were these two phenomena related? Probably. And they may also have been
caused by many common factors. This paper suggests that the entry of foreign capital
may change the political game in a way that leads to increased openness to international
trade, regardless of the form that foreign capital takes (foreign equity acquisition or entry
by foreign firms into the host economy) and its trade orientation (whether foreign capital
enters the export- or import-competing sector.
It is  shown within a Ricardo-Viner model  of lobbying that acquisition  of an existing
domestic firm cannot lead to higher levels of protection, regardless of  foreign capital
trade orientation (i.e., whether the acquisition of the existing domestic firm occurs in the
import- or export-competing sector). The forces at play are income redistribution from
foreign to national owners of factors by reducing the level of protection when foreign
capital enters the domestic market. In the case of new entry by foreign firms, it is shown
that in the case where the foreign firm enters the export-competing sector, protection also
unambiguously falls. The forces at play are increased counter-lobbying by the export-
competing sector and reduced pro-lobbying in the import-competing sector due to a scale
effect associated with the increase in the equilibrium wage. If foreign entry occurs in the
import-competing  sector,  then  protection  might  increase  due  also  to  a  scale  effect.
However, under  a reasonable assumption on the value of the elasticity  of substitution
between labour and capital, it can be shown that protection will also fall.
I1  Introduction
Investment abroad has exploded in the last two decades. In  1997, world inflows of
Foreign  Direct Investment  (FDI) were 9 times larger than in the early 1980s.  During the
same period, the sum of FDI and total portfolio  investment  into the developing  world
increased 11 times.' Participation  of developing  countries as hosts of world FDI also
2 significantly  increased  from 6% in 1985  to 15%  in 1997. Such an increasingly  important
phenomenon  cannot be ignored when analyzing  the detenninants  of international  trade
policy.
3 An often-expressed  fear is that foreign investors, concerned  with the return on
their investment, may increase lobbying pressures for tariffs in the host country. An
example is the reported lobbying pressures  by Multinational  Corporations  in some host
countries  during  the Europe  Agreements  (see Messerlin,  1993).
However,  as  world  FDI  flows  increased tenfold,  an  important wave  of  trade
liberalization,  at the multilateral,  unilateral  and bilateral level, struck worldwide.  Were
these two phenomena  related?  Probably. And they may also have been caused  by many
common factors. This paper  offers a  potential explanation for trade  liberalization
following  FDI inflows  into a host country.  It argues  that the significant  increase  of FDI in
host countries changes the political game in a way that leads to increased openness to
international trade. Thus, it can  partially explain the  simultaneous worldwide rush
towards  free-trade  and the surge in capital  flows in recent  decades. 4
Hillman and Ursprung  (1993) were among  the first to introduce  the presence  of foreign
capital into the theory of endogenous  protection.  They argue that horizontally  integrated
MNCs tend to be more protectionist  than national enterprises,  which have no foreign
1  Figures  are from UNCTC  (1998).
2 FDI,  MNC and foreign  capital  are not synonymous,  but our  analysis  is not based on their differences  and
we therefore  treat  them similarly.
3  Note that during the same period merchandise  trade was 'only' multiplied by 3.5 (see WTO, Annual
Report 1998, vol. II, p.  18-19).
4Other  papers  (e.g., Horstmann and Markusen, 1992) have analysed the opposite question: how does tariff
policy affect the  level of FDI? It is clear that a complete analysis of the relationship between tariffs and
foreign capital should include  both questions. This is beyond the scope of this paper.  I assume  foreign
capital as being exogenously given prior to the political game taking place.
2production  plants.5 The  reason  is  that  horizontally integrated  firms  have  interest  in
protecting all markets where they own plants, whereas national enterprises only desire
protection in the national marlket, since protection in foreign markets can only hurt their
export possibilities.  They also show, within an imperfect competition  framework, that
MNCs'  bias towards  more protection leads to  lower tariffs. This  result  is essentially
driven by  the rationale for  free-riding a  la Olson (1965) in  larger groups. While  the
political  economy model developed here by Hillman and Ursprung (1993)  focuses on
issues related to horizontally-integrated MNCs, in this paper I abstract from these types
of problems. Instead, I consider a broader definition of foreign-owned capital that may
also apply to portfolio investment or FDI not necessarily done by MNCs. This allows me
to build a taxonomy within a general equilibrium setting.6
In  another  study  of the  effects  of  foreign  capital  entry on  the  endogenous  level  of
protection,  Hillman  and  Ursprung  (1996),  argue that  because  of  populist  sentiment
against foreign ownership and the fact that political support increases with the level of
protection, the government can only achieve the most liberal trade policy when there is
no  foreign capital in  the "host"  country. Thus, protection increases with  the entry  of
foreign  capital  into  the  economy.  This  goes  against  my  main  result  in  this  paper.
However, their  results  rely on the  idea that there  exists  a populist  sentiment against
foreign ownership, from which I abstract. I consider that agents only care for foreign
capital entry if it affects prices or income.
An important contribution is by Grossman and Helpman (1996), which focuses on the
endogenous  determination  of  FDI  and  tariffs  using  the  influence-driven  approach
developed in Grossman and Helpman (1994). In their 1996 paper, FDI is essentially quid-
pro-quo  foreign  investment  as  defined  by  Bhagwati  (1987),  where  international
' Vertically  integrated  MNCs, excluded  from their analysis,  obviously  tend to be less protectionist  since
tariffs increase  the costs of intra-firm  trade.
6 Another important  difference  between  this paper and Hillman and Ursprung  (1993) is the assumption
about market structure. Here the market structure  is one of perfect competition  whereas Hilhnan and
Ursprung  (1993)  have Cournot  players.  The perfect  competition  assumption  probably  corresponds  more to
portfolio  investment  abroad  rather than FDI since  the portfolio  flows are due to factor  rewards  differentials
where FDI arises when firms are in quest of larger  profits  abroad  due to imperfect  markets.  The advantage
3investment is made in anticipation of changes in the host country's trade policy and with
the intention of diffusing a protectionist threat. Though the paper does not focus wholly
on the effects of the presence  of FDI on tariff levels, it concludes that  lower  costs of
foreign entry yields lower protection. I use the same political-economy framework as in
Grossman and Helpman (1996) but focus on different issues. First, I do not consider the
specific issues linked to quid-pro-quo foreign investment (home-based foreign firms do
not  export  to the  home market  from  foreign-based subsidiaries  or headquarters),  but
adopt a broader definition of foreign-owned capital. The abstraction from quid-pro-quo
FDI implies that foreign- and national-owned firms will lobby for protection in a similar
way  (as  in  Hillman  and  Ursprung,  1993), instead  of  foreign  capital  in  the  import-
competing sector trying to diffuse protection. Second, I do not explore the determinants
of FDI levels. Thus, foreign capital is exogenous and in fixed supply.
Recent contributions by Ellingsen and Warneyrd (1999) and Konishi, Saggi and Weber
(1999), which treat FDI as endogenous, also argue that fear of attracting inward-looking
FDI into the domestic market may lead domestic lobbies to reduce their pressures for
protection. Thus, in equilibrium, tariffs (and FDI) are lower in import-competing sectors.
The  mechanisms  for reducing protection  in this  paper  are different,  as  again  FDI  is
exogenously given.
One of the important differences between this paper and the above contributions is that it
not  only  concentrates on  import-competing FDI, but  also export-competing  FDI.  In a
recent  study of the  Mexican structure  of protection, Grether, de  Melo  and  Olarreaga
(1  999) show that the effects of foreign ownership on the levels of protection are different
depending on foreign capital trade's  orientation. In this paper, entry of foreign capital
into the export-competing sector will have different effects on the equilibrium level of
protection  than  entry  by  inward-looking  foreign  capital.  Moreover,  we  not  only
concentrate on entry by foreign firms, but also explore the case of equity acquisition by
foreign capital (as in Hillman and Ursprung, 1996). It turns out that the results from the
of  assuming perfectly competitive markets is that it allows us to analyse the  problem within  a general
equilibrium  framework.
4model, regardless of the type of foreign capital, are broadly consistent with the recent
rush towards free-trade, while capital inflows have surged.
This  paper builds  a  taxonomy  of  the  effects  of  the entry  of  foreign  capital  on  the
endogenous  level  of  protection within a  standard Ricardo-Viner  model.  To  this  end,
drawing on Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (1997),7 I develop a model of lobbying with
general equilibrium interactions on the supply side, in the sense that domestic and foreign
owners of  specific capital  compete for  scarce resources  in  the host  economy.  These
general equilibrium interactions will be important factors in detennining the evolution of
the level of protection. Two other important determinants will be at play. First, the trade
orientation of foreign capital, i.e., whether foreign capital enters the export- or import-
competing sector, and second, whether entry of foreign capital occurs through acquisition
of existing domestic firms or new entry by foreign firms.
To anticipate the results, it is first shown that acquisition of an existing domestic firm will
lead to lower levels of protection when foreign capital enters the import-competing sector
and remains unchanged if foreign capital enters the export-competing sector. The main
force at play in the first result is income redistribution from foreign to national owners of
factors by reducing protection when foreign capital enters the domestic market. In the
case of new entry by owners of foreign capital, protection falls when foreign entry occurs
in the export-competing sector. The forces at play are, first, increased counter-lobbying
by the export-competing  sector, which competes for labour in the labour market,  and
second, reduced pro-lobbying incentives in the import-competing sector due to a scale
effect.  New  entry by owners of  foreign capital into the import-competing  sector has
ambiguous effects. It can be shown, however, that if the elasticity of substitution between
labour and capital is sufficiently small, protection also falls.
Section 2 develops the political economy model of endogenous tariff determination in a
Ricardo-Viner  framework. Section 3  considers the  case of foreign equity  acquisition,
'  Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga  (1997) is itself an extension  of Grossman  and Helpman  (1994a). There
exists different approaches  to endogenous  formation  of trade protection  in the literature,  but as suggested
by Helpman (1995), results of alternative approaches tend to converge.
5whereas  section 4 studies the case of new entry by owners of foreign capital into the
import- and export-competing sectors. Section 5 concludes.
2  Foreign-owned capital and lobbying
Consider a small open economy with 2 sectors; X an export sector and M an import-
competing  sector.8 To  abstract  from  consumption effects  we  assume  that  consumers'
utility function is quasi-linear on the export good X, which serves as numeraire (units are
also chosen  so that the  export price equals  1). Quasi-linearity of  the utility  function
allows us to abstract from income effects in consumption of good M.9 For simplicity it is
also assumed that owners of foreign capital do not consume in the host country.'0 Each
good  is produced using a  sector-specific factor (capital) and  a mobile  factor (labour)
under constant returns to scale.
Factor-specific ownership generates lobbying as suggested by the distributive properties
of the Ricardo-Viner model. Specific-factor ownership is concentrated to the extent that
the individuals  making  up the  lobbies consider their share  of consumer surplus to be
negligible. However, protectionist policies in the import sector do affect the export sector
profits through endogenous changes in the wage rate; thus owners of specific capital in
the export sector also have incentives to lobby, but against tariffs in the import sector.  1I 
A share of the sector specific factors is foreign-owned, so that sector specific capital is
essentially mobile  across countries but  not across sectors.1 2 Owners of foreign capital
also lobby the government to defend their interests. It is assumed throughout that they are
8 The appendix of Olarreaga (1997) develops the n-good version of the model.
9 The choice of a quasi-linear utility function in a two-good model may seem awkward, but this is done
only to simplify the presentation. As shown in the appendix of Olarreaga (1997) the model can be easily
extended to an n-good model without modifying the main results. When the quasi-linearity of the utility
function becomes a crucial assumption, it will be explicitly acknowledged.
'1  To allow owners of foreign capital to consume in the host country does not change the results so long as
they have the same preferences as national consumers.
"  The export sector can also lobby for export subsidies but for the simplicity of exposition we assume no
export subsidies. In any event, the simplification is immaterial in a 2-good  economy. I also abstract for
intermediate goods issues. Cadot et al. (1997) develops this but abstracts from foreign-owned capital.
12  This  may  be  justified  by  the  fact  that  factor  owners  face  smaller  adjustment  costs  when  they
geographically reallocate their production plants than when they shift into a new sector.
6as  efficient  in  their  lobbying  activities  as  owners of  national capital.  Labour  is not
organised.
As  in  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994),  all  lobbies move  simultaneously  as  multiple
principals  in  the political  game by facing their  common agent, the government,  with
contribution  schedulesC,(q)conditioned  on  the  domestic  price  of  the  import  good
q (i = X, M) . The government then sets a tariff on the import good yielding the domestic
equilibrium  price, which  is the  best  response  to  the lobbies'  contribution  schedules.
Formally, the government maximises an objective function V, which combines political
contributions and national social welfare. The latter reflects the government's  concern for
the  average  voter,  and  the  former the  government's  concern  for  political  campaign
contributions (the weight on social welfare being a > 0):13
V(q) = YCi(q)+  aW(q)(1
where  C, (q)  is  lobby  i's  contribution  schedule  and  W(q) stands  for  national  social
welfare as a function of prices.
Let  /Tj (q) be the aggregate profit function for  sector i  (i.e., the income  of owners of
specific capital to sector i).  Profits in sector X depend only indirectly on the price of the
import good, through the endogenous adjustment of the wage rate w. Then provided that
an interior solution to the govemrnent's problem exists and assuming as in Grossman and
Helpman  (1994)  that  the  contribution  schedules  are  'locally  truthful'  (i.e.,  that  at
equilibrium the slope of contribution schedules is the same as the slope of the lobbies'
profit  function), the first-order condition determining the domestic price  of the import
good i is:
13 In this setting,  there is no room for free-riding  a la Olson.  Note  however,  that  the empirical  and
theoretical evidence on free-riding in larger groups is mixed as discussed by Bilal (1998).
7VI  = av(q)  = E  a a(q) +  W  a(q)  = 0  (2)
We first calculate the lobbying effect, i.e., the first term in (2), using Hotelling's lemma
aq ={iM}YMW  aq
where  I i=.l  is  an  indicator  function  taking  on  the  value  1 when  i= M and  zero
otherwise;  yM  is total production of the import good that includes foreign owned firms
production. Thus, the effect of a change in q on aggregate political contributions (i.e., on
producer profits in both sectors) is
E  aq  M  aq  (4)
where  y=xj,i  =-M  +AX'
Let us now determine the effect on social welfare (the second term in (2)) of a change in
the import good price. At any point, the national economy is characterized by its income-
expenditure identity, namely'4
e(l, q, W) - r(1,  q, k"°,  k f, f) + T(q)  (5)
where 1 is the price of the export good (i.e., the numrraire), e is the national expenditure
function,  r  is  the  national  revenue  function  (or  Gross  National  Product),  T  is  the
aggregate tariff revenue function,  k"a  is the vector of sector specific national capital and
kf  if the vector of foreign capital in the host  country. Note that  national and foreign
14 As I am only concerned  with national  welfare,  I exclude  from the national  revenue  function,  r, foreign-
owned capital.
8capital enter separately into the national revenue function. Finally  is total fix labour
supply. All factors, national and foreign, are in fixed supply. Differentiating this identity
with  respect to q, letting  eq  and  r, 1stand respectively for the partial derivatives of the
expenditure and revenue functions with respect to q and ew  stand for the partial derivative
of the expenditure function with respect to the level  of utility (i.e., the inverse of the
marginal utility of income), gives
e,+e,,,  = r+  (6)
W aq  aq 
Using Shephard's and Hotelling's lemmas together with the fact that the marginal utility
of income is one (given the quasi-linear utility function), gives
aw  _  ,-in  +  "  (7)
Oq  Oq
where  m  wc  (q)  - y 4 [q, w(q)]  (CA4 and  y"'  are respectively  national  consumption
and national production of the import good). Thus mn"  stands for national 'imports'.  Note
that the notion of national imports is only hypothetical as actual imports equal aggregate
imports  (m"I = cAd(q)  - y'  [q, w(q)]). National imports stand for the hypothetical  level
of imports in the absence of foreign capital and had prices been equal to actual domestic
prices.1 5
Choose units so that all international prices are equal to  1. Then  t = q -1 is the tariff in
'specific'  or 'ad-valorem'  form; tariff revenue is then T(q) = tmag  , so that
- = m"K  +tdm  (8)
Oq  dq
15 See Bhagwati  and  Brecher  (1980)  for the same  definition.  Note that  here consumption  at the aggregate
and hypothetical  national levels  are identical  given  the quasi-linear  utility function.
9where dmag/dq = Omag/lq +m`g/1waw/waq . Substituting (8) into (7), yields:
aW  mag  _m,za  +tdm  (9)
aq  dq
Substituting (4) and (9) into (2) yields:
=  Y  - e  +a  mag  _ Mna + td  - =  (10)
aq jamdq  (I0
The  term  in  square  brackets  represents  the  influence  of  political  factors  in  the
determination of the import tariff, while the term in parenthesis represents the influence
of efficiency (social welfare) factors.
Rewritten in elasticity form and rearranged, (10) becomes
t  q  j_(,  qL4  )  (mag  (l")
q  a  m  m
where  s'  is  the elasticity  of the wage  with  respect to  a  change in  the  price  of the
q~~~~~
importable ( q)  and  41is  the general equilibrium price elasticity of import demand in
absolute value.  6 The term outside brackets stands for the usual Ramsey pricing rule; the
higher is the price elasticity of import demand (here we include the general equilibrium
effect through the wage on import demand). The first term inside brackets is the lobbying
rationale for the tariff which includes both pro-lobbying by the import sector and counter-
16 Note that if we exclude  the general  equilibrium  wage effect  (=  0 ) and we assume  no foreign  capital
(mnau  = in`  ), so that there is no gap between national and aggregate imports, equation (11) becomes
Grossman and Helpman (1994a) optimal tariff.
10lobbying by the export sector. It is divided by the weight given to social welfare in the
governmnent's  objective function and obviously the larger is a, the smaller the politically
determined  tariff.  The  second  term  inside  brackets  captures  the  trade  distortion
introduced by the entry of foreign capital. The presence of foreign capital implies that
part of what is consumed in the host economy is now "imported" from foreign producers
in the host country and therefore is not subject to a tariff. This in turn implies that it does
not generate any tariff revenue. l  7
For tractability, from now on I assume that all sectors have identical real wage elasticities
of labour demand. Then it can be shown that <"  =  £M/L' 8 Substituting this result into
(1 1) yields:
i  1k  +M  ag  _  M  (12)
q  q  m  |  a q  Trade distortion
'I  -'  I  1  oriiicolme
Rarnzsey  pricing  -Pro  and  Counter-  redistribuition
lobbying  forces
where  rM is the endogenous capital remuneration in the import sector and  kM is the total
capital stock in the import sector of the host economy. For exposition purposes let us
rewrite (12) as:
t  =  iD  (T +  .)  whereD-  1  T=  rMkM ;andQ  = mag- ma  (13)
q  11 '  m a  a q
q
Thus,  1D  is the Ramsey pricing term;  T  captures the pro- and  counter-lobbying forces
and Q captures the trade distortion introduced by the presence of foreign capital.
17 Alternatively  one could see this term as capturing  income  redistribution  from  nationals  to owners  of
foreign  capital  in the host economy  (see Bhagwati  and Brecher  (1980),  Schweinberger  and Vosgereau
(1997) and Olarreaga (1998) for examples within a welfare maximising context with more general demand
systems.
18 See Cadot et al. (1997) for a formal proof. Note that in the case of CES production functions with the
same labour/capital elasticity of substitution across sectors, this result always holds, regardless of factor
shares.
11In the next sections I explore the effects of changes in the presence of foreign-owned
capital on the equilibrium tariff given by (13). We will first examine the case of foreign
equity acquisition in both the import and export sector and then explore the case of new
entry by foreign firm into the import or export sector.
3  Foreign equity acquisition of existing domestic firms
To capture the effects of foreign equity acquisition on the endogenous level of protection,
we  will try  to  determine  the evolution  of  the  right hand  side  of  (13).  That  is  how
WD,  T  and Q  change after foreign equity acquisition. We will distinguish between foreign
equity acquisition in the export- and import-competing sectors sector.
If foreign capital purchases national firms (or shares) in the export-competing sector, this
will have no effect on any of the determinants of (13). All the equilibrium factor prices
will remain the same and therefore quantities produced and consumed of the imported
good will remain unchanged.  This implies  Aq)  = AT = AQ = 0.  And entry of foreign
equity into the export-competing sector will leave the level of protection unchanged.
Foreign equity acquisition into the import sector will also leave factor prices unchanged.
However, this  will create a gap between goods imported at the aggregate level which
remain unchanged and goods imported at the national level. Indeed, following foreign
equity acquisition of domestic firms in the import-competing sector, the level of national
production in the import-competing sector declines. This leads to an increase of imports
at the national level (which are satisfied by the increase in foreign production in the host
country). This implies  AQ < 0,  which by (13) leads to a fall in the level of protection.
The  rationale  is  that  part  of  the  protection  of  the  import-competing  sector  is  now
12redistributing income to foreign-owned capital and thus incentives to protect the import
sector are lower.19
Foreign equity acquisition of domestic firms cannot therefore lead to an increase in the
level of protection. It will remain unchanged if foreign equity acquisition occurs in the
export-competing  sector  and  will  fall  if  foreign  capital  enters the  import-competing
sector.
4  New entry by foreign firms and the level of protection
Entry by new firms will affect factor prices and produced quantities in the economy. This
in turn will lead to changes in the endogenous level of protection. Let's  consider in turn
the cases of new entry into the export- and import-competing sectors. 20
New entry by foreign firms into the export-competing sector will lead to an increase in
aggregate labour demand, which  in turn translates into an increase  in the  equilibrium
wage. This will reduce quantities produced in the import-competing sector and reduce the
endogenous level of capital remuneration in this sector. This implies a reduction in  r.,
which leads to AT < 0.  and an increase in m"g, which leads to  AD < 0.  The first effect
captures an increase in counter-lobbying in the labour market by the export-competing
sector and  a  decline  in  pro-lobbying  activities  by  the  import-competing  sector. The
second effect captures the increase in the efficiency cost of protection. Indeed given our
iso-elastic  import  demand  function,  an  outward  shift  in  import  demand  needs  to  be
compensated by an increase in the slope of the import demand function. This increases
the efficiency cost of protection for a given tariff by Ramsey pricing rule. Thus these two
19 Note that foreign  equity  acquisition  does not lead to any change  in national  income  if nationals  are
"rationally"  compensated  for selling  their share of domestic  firms.  This  in turn assure  that there  are no
changes  in national  consumption  (at the existing  domestic  price).  Quasi-linearity  of the utility function
would  have  also ensured  that  changes  in income  would  not have affected  the level of consumption  of the
imported  good.
20 Throughout  this section,  it is assumed  that the price  elasticity  of import  demand  remains  the same  after
the entry of new firms in the market, i.e., import demand are iso-elastic.
13forces push for a lower level of protection. Note that if aggregate imports increase, there
is no gap between imports at the aggregate and the national level since there is no foreign
production of the imported good in the host country. This implies that the last term  in
(13) remains unchanged (2Q  = 0).
To  summarise, after new  entry by foreign firms into the export-competing  sector, the
equilibrium level of protection declines due to an increase in counter-lobbying forces by
the export sector competing in the labour market, a decrease in pro-lobbying forces by
the import sector, and an increase in the efficiency cost of protection for a given tariff.
New entry by foreign firms in the import competing sector has ambiguous effects on the
level of protection. However, it can be shown that if the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour in the import-competing sector is smaller than the share of labour in
output, then protection will fall after the entry of new firms into the import-competing
sector.
To see this, let us rewrite equation (13) as:
t  -=  (  + (DO  and AS- < 0  (@A  )  +  ±A(Q  ) < 0  (14)
q  q
Now, first note that after the entry of new foreign finns into the import-competing sector,
imports at the aggregate level, mal, fall as production in the host country increases. On
the  other  hand,  national  production  in  the  import-competing  sector  declines  as  the
increase  in  the  equilibrium  wage  associated  with  entry  of  foreign  capital  into  the
economy leads to a fall in national production. This in turn implies that national imports
increase.  These  two  effects  imply  that  the  trade  distortion  term,  Q,  declines,  i.e.,
AQ < 0, which calls for a lower tariff based on income redistribution effects.
The Ramsey pricing term will increase due to the fall in aggregate imports. Again, the
reason is that given the constant price elasticity import demand function an inward shift
14of the import demand curve needs to be accompanied by a reduction in the slow of the
import demand curve. This in turn implies that the efficiency loss associated with the
same tariff is lower, which calls for a tariff increase, i.e., AcD  > 0.
Thus, the evolution of the second term on the right hand  side of (14) seems a priori
undetermined, as AO < 0 and At) > 0  . However, straightforward algebra leads to:
AI'  Am  AQ  Ama  A_?  (15)
A=-  Ag  and  AO=  A  A(15)
CtD  m  ag  Q  m  g -m"
A quick observation of equation (14) and recalling that  Am'g < 0  and  Amna  > 0 leads to
the fact that the percentage change in  'F is smaller in absolute value than the percentage
change in Q. This implies that the second term on the right hand side of (14) is negative.
Thus the combination of the changes in the Ramsey pricing and trade distortion terms
after new entry of foreign capital into the import-competing sector calls for a lower level
of protection.
Let us now focus on the evolution of the lobbying term, P.  The sign of AT will  depend
on  the  effect  that  entry by  new  firms  have  on total  capital  revenue  in  the  import-
competing sector,  rM kM.  Capital increases in the import-competing sector given new
entry by foreign firms. This in turn will lead to a decline in the endogenous remuneration
of capital in the import-competing sector. Again, the sign of AT will depend on which of
these  two  effects  dominates.  It  is  shown  in  the  appendix that  in  the  case  of  linear
homogenous production functions:
A(rM kM)I 1 mAkM  (16)
where  a.  = w  J A/q  y'g is the share of labour payments in total revenue in the import-
competing sector, and a  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in this
sector. From  (16),  it is  easy  to  verify that  the change  in capital  payments  following
15foreign  entry into  the  import competing  sector will have  the  opposite sign  than  the
exogenous increase in the capital stock in the import competing sector if  ar < a..  Thus,
assuming that the elasticity of substitution is smaller than the share of labour payment in
total revenue in the import competing sector, the lobbying term declines, i.e.,  AT < 0.
The rationale behind this result is that if it is very costly to replace labour and capital in
the production process, then an  increase in the capital  stock in the  import-competing
sector will be very costly in terms of the increase in wages. This reduces pro-lobbying
forces  in  the  import-competing  sector  and  increases  counter-lobbying  forces  in  the
export-competing sector.
To sign the evolution of the first term in (14) one has to again compare two effects going
in  opposite direction. The Ramsey pricing term calls for higher tariff and the lobbying
term for lower tariffs under  Cr < a,  . However, if the elasticity of substitution between
labour and capital is sufficiently small then the second effect dominates and the first term
of (14) declines with entry by foreign capital into the import competing sector.
Combining this  result with the fact that the second term will also  decline, leads us to
conclude that if the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is sufficiently
small, then the endogenous level  of protection will tend to  decline after the entry  of
foreign capital into the import-competing sector.
5  Concluding remarks
The increasing importance of capital flows calls for an analysis of their effect on trade
policy formulation in host countries. Using a political economy model to study the effects
of  the entry of foreign capital  on protectionist pressures, this  paper  shows that  tariff
reductions are much more likely to occur after the entry of foreign capital. Ultimately, the
effects on the endogenous level of protection depends on  foreign-owned capital trade
orientation (whether it enters the import- or the export-competing sector) and on whether
16investment abroad takes the form of acquisition of existing domestic firms or new entry
into the market.
In the case of acquisition of existing domestic firms, protection will remain unchanged if
foreign  capital  enters  the  export-competing  sector. Acquisition  has  no  effect  on  the
equilibrium prices and quantities in this model and therefore the incentives to lobby and
protect remain the same. On the other hand, foreign acquisition of existing firms in the
import-competing  sector  creates  a  gap  between  aggregate  imports  (which  remain
unchanged) and national "imports"  (i.e., the difference between national production and
consumption).  This  trade  distortion  reduces  the  incentives  to  protect  the  import-
competing sector since part of this protection now benefits foreign capital. Thus, foreign
acquisition of existing domestic firms in the import-competing sector leads to a decline in
the level of protection.
Entry of foreign firms into the export-competing sector also leads to a  decrease in the
level  of protection.  This is  induced by  an increase  in  counter-lobbying forces  in  the
export-competing  sector  and  a  reduction  in  the  pro-lobbying  forces  in  the  import-
competing sector associated with the wage increase after the entry of new firms in the
market leads to a shift in labour demand at the aggregate level. Also, this wage increase
naturally causes a decline in the production of the imported good, which in turn leads to a
shift  in the import  demand curve. This,  in turn, is  associated with  an increase  in the
efficiency cost of a given tariff.
Entry of  foreign firms  into the  import-competing sector has  ambiguous effects in the
level of protection. However, I showed that for a sufficiently low elasticity of substitution
between labour and capital, import protection will fall. This could perhaps  be a more
reasonable assumption for developing countries where elasticities of substitution tend to
be smaller than in developed countries.
Thus, it appears that regardless of the form that investment abroad takes and its trade
orientation, trade liberalization should follow an increase in FDI or portfolio investment
17abroad, which may partially explain the simultaneous rush towards free trade and  the
important surge in investment abroad observed during the last two decades.
It is appropriate to conclude with several cautionary notes. First, throughout the paper I
considered that foreign capital was exogenously given. A natural extension would be to
endogenise the level of foreign capital by introducing the determinants of foreign capital
into the analysis. Second, it was also assumed that owners of foreign capital are equally
efficient as nationals in their  lobbying activities. This may not be the case, providing
another channel that could affect the results reached here.
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20Appendix
The objective of this appendix is to show that equation (16) in the paper holds, i.e.:
A(rM kM)  I  a,  AkM  (17)
The change in the remuneration of capital is given by:
A(rM kM) _  AkM + Arm  (18)
rM kAI  kM  rM
Profit maximization ensure that in equilibrium:
rM  =  q  fk  (19)
where  fk  is the marginal productivity of capital. Differentiating (19) for a given domestic
price, yields:
ArM = q fkk  Ak/A  (20)
where  fkk  is the second derivative of the production function with respect to capital,  kM.
Assuming a linear homogenous production function:
k  4M  fe  fk  (21)
Profit maximization implies:
f  - and  fk  -(22)
q  q
Substituting (22) into (21), the result into (20), and finally into (18) yields (17).
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